Zubaz Ανδρικό Standard Classic Zebra Printed Athletic Lounge Παντελόνι X-Small Multi

Name: Zubaz Ανδρικό Standard Classic Zebra Printed Athletic Lounge Παντελόνι X-Small Multi
Brand: Zubaz
SKU: 0842202168559
Price: 47.80 HUF
Availability: InStock

Brand:Zubaz

2.9/5

Ft
47.80

Από την αρχή, στόχος μας στο Zubaz ήταν να αναπτύξουμε τα πιο άνετα παντελόνια στον κόσμο για άνδρες και γυναίκες που τολμούν να είναι διαφορετικά. Σήμερα, προσπαθούμε να προωθήσουμε τη μοναδική μας επωνυμία ρούχων, συγχωνεύοντας τα κλασικά τολμηρά μας prints με το μοντέρνο αθλητικό στυλ. Ο υψηλής ποιότητας εξοπλισμός θαυμαστών μας που διαθέτει επίσημη άδεια από τις αγαπημένες σας ομάδες NFL και NCAA. Προσφέρουμε μια μεγάλη ποικιλία από χαρακτηριστικές σειρές ενεργών ρούχων που περιλαμβάνουν τα πάντα, από σαλονάκια, καπέλα, κολάν, σορτς, μπλουζάκια, πουλόβερ με λαιμόκοψη και φούτερ με φερμουάρ. Κάντε το δώρο που θα λατρέψει κάθε ποδοσφαιρόφιλος ή απόφοιτος των αθλητικών μας ενδυμάτων με άδεια! Ιδανικό για άνεση όλο το χρόνο, αυτό το απαλό και άνετο ρούχο θα σας κρατήσει ζεστούς σε ένα χειμερινό πάρτι στην πίσω πόρτα και είναι αρκετά ελαφρύ για να το φοράτε όλο το καλοκαίρι.

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EAN: 0842202168559

Κατηγορίες Ενδυμασία, Shoes & Jewelry, Άνδρες, Ενδυμασία, Active, Active Pants,

Από τη δεκαετία του 1980, το Zubaz έγινε γνωστό για τον περιπετειώδη σχεδιασμό, την υψηλή ποιότητα προϊόντων και την εκπληκτική του άνεση. Ιδανικό για χρήση όλο το χρόνο, αυτό το παντελόνι θα σας κρατήσει ζεστό το χειμώνα, αλλά είναι αρκετά ελαφρύ για να το φοράτε όλο το καλοκαίρι. Για καλύτερη φροντίδα, πλύνετε στο πλυντήριο κρύο και στεγνώστε σε χαμηλά επίπεδα. Προσθέστε λίγη άνεση στην γκαρνταρόμπα σας με αυτό το φαρδύ, χαλαρό παντελόνι με ελαστική ζώνη στη μέση, δύο μπροστινές τσέπες και ρυθμιζόμενο κλείσιμο με κορδόνια περίσφιξης. Διατίθεται σε μεγέθη XS-XXL. Αναδείξτε το στυλ σας με αυτά τα ευρύχωρα ανδρικά παντελόνια με το εμβληματικό σχέδιο με ρίγες ζέβρας, διαθέσιμο σε μεγάλη ποικιλία από τολμηρά και συναρπαστικά χρώματα. Αυθεντικό μοτίβο Zubaz κλασικής εκτύπωσης ζέβρας. Πλύσιμο στο πλυντήριο Χωρίς κλείσιμο. Εισαγόμενος. 60% βαμβάκι, 40% πολυεστέρας.

Department	Mens
Manufacturer	Zubaz

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Scritto da: Kindle Customer

it reads like it all happened yesterday not fifty years ago

If you recently watched the Ken Burns opus on PBS and want to dig deeper into why the war proved so difficult to 'win', this may be the book for you. Consider this a case study in how the Communists won. The author researched and wrote the book after spending two years with the US Army in Vietnam. He returned to South Vietnam, focused on one province just south of Saigon and went to work. A rare American who learned Vietnamese on his own; he appears to have interviewed many prominent Government officials as well Viet Cong defectors. The detail is impressive. The perspective is fair to both sides. Both sides had strategies; one had the strategy for victory; the other for defeat. The former he summarized as' the communist leadership's comprehensive view of revolution of as a stage by stage social process'. It was first published in 1972 and reissued in 2010. Given the current interest in the Vietnam War, it reads like it all happened yesterday not fifty years ago.

Scritto da: Amazon Customer

Great for experts- not so much for the novice

This book is a very dense, dry and scholarly review of how the onset of the Vietnam war affected one province of Vietnam and why, ultimately America did not prevail there. It is definitely not for those unused to scholarly and exhaustive writing but if that is what you are seeking it is at turns, fascinating and maddening. The author seems at times to get bogged down in details that seem irrelavant or overly expository. For the dedicated student of the Vietnam War it is definitely worth reading but for those looking for a more general overview, this is not the place to start.

Scritto da: Peter Schaefer

Why We Lost

Simply the best book on the conduct of the war in Vietnam on the ground. Race was not pedantic in presenting "lessons learned" but the lessons are there to be learned for anyone willing to read the book. Sadly no one in authority in the US government -- especially David Petraeus who authored the Army handbook on postwar "stability operations" -- read this book before we started our trillion dollar campaign to win the hearts and minds of Afghans and Iraqis.

Scritto da: Cascadian

Required reading for every American

Amazing. Every high school or college student should be taught this story of a long and ugly struggle of the Vietnamese people against their own elite class. The courage of those who rebelled is amazing, and the people were so thoroughly downtroden. Then on top of that, the Americans, who had no idea what was really going on, came in and devastated the country.

Scritto da: Capt Keith Kopets, USMC

LONG AN PROVINCE: A Case Study in Insurgency

Twenty-eight years has not diminished the value of this brilliant study. Jeffrey Race wrote War Comes to Long An as his doctoral dissertation. Also a former US Army officer, Race served as a district advisor in Vietnam. After leaving the Army, Race returned to Vietnam as an independent researcher. He is fluent in Vietnamese-which opened many doors that would otherwise be shut to an American in rural Vietnam. All of these qualifications enhance Race's creditability. Furthermore, they help explain why War Comes to Long An achieves its stated purpose: to show how the Communist revolutionary movement was able to succeed in the South Vietnamese province of Long An. /// Saigon's fatal flaw was their perception of the revolutionary movement, according to Race. The overthrow of the "local elite" at the village level-not the expulsion of the French-was the most significant accomplishment of the Vietminh during the Resistance (p. 40). Vietminh strategy had fused anti-imperialist and anti-feudal themes, resulting in an economic revolution for the countryside. But Ngo Dinh Diem alienated the peasantry by returning the corrupt village councils that had been exiled with the French. Therefore: "... to say that the government later [after the First Indochina War] 'lost control' is misleading, and any analysis which proposes to answer the question of why the government 'lost control' or why there was an 'erosion of mass support for established institutions' is addressing the wrong question (p. 41)." /// Race acknowledges that there were some gains made by the government-as well as internal conflict within the revolutionary movement. But he devotes the majority of the book to analyzing the Communist exploitation of Saigon's ill-conceived policies. Diem's centralized method of government provides an example. South Vietnam was better characterized as a conglomerate of hamlets than as a nation state. Culture varied throughout the country and was largely shaped by local customs. The majority of the Vietnamese population equated "government" with their local village council. Yet the province chief was the first government administrator with any true decision-making authority. (This is one of the reasons the author chooses the province as the basic unit of his study.) In contrast, the Communist Lao Dong Party established their executive agent (the chi bo) at the village level. /// Land is the single most important factor to the peasant in Long An. In addition to its economic value (particularly in the fertile Mekong Delta region-where Long An is located), land is the focal point of family life and religion in Vietnam. It is where a family buries and worships their ancestors and where each family member expects to be interred. For these reasons, concludes Race, the agroville and strategic hamlet programs-by separating the peasantry from their land-were doomed from the start. Furthermore, Race correctly asserts that the revolutionary movement was more successful in "maneuvering the government to overthrow itself" than simply "overthrowing the government" (p. 159). /// Saigon's land reform policy and its effects on the population of Long An receive careful scrutiny. Race successfully applies an analytical methodology to support his assertion: "it is hard to see how the government's land reform could have fulfilled its stated purpose of turning a dissatisfied peasantry into a satisfied one, even if it had been implemented to the fullest" (p. 60). Meanwhile, the Party exploited the government's ineptitude by garnering support from the population. Land was promised to the peasant that supported the revolution. Thus the countryside became inextricably tied to the Party's cause, concludes the author. /// Race presents his evidence effectively. Oral histories from three former province chiefs are introduced in the first chapter. Their recollections are compared with similar accounts from contemporaneous Long An peasants. The results illuminate Saigon's single-minded mandarin approach to "securing" the countryside. These oral histories also demonstrate the conceptual differences between the government and the Party's approach. The government felt the unrest in the countryside was simply a "security" problem. In reality, the Party-in addition to its use of violence and terrorism-was successfully leading a multidimensional socioeconomic revolution. Likewise, the Communists truly knew what motivated the average Vietnamese. Race succinctly illustrates the logic and simplicity of the Party's strategy: "... the accuracy of the Party's judgment was to be proved over and over again in Long An after 1960, as outpost after outpost surrendered without firing a shot. In the Party's view a man will not risk his life only for the sake of his pay, or because he has been drafted. He will only do so for clearly perceived interests involving himself, his family, or his own idea of country (p. 95)." /// There are shortfalls to this book. It is not an easy read. A typical passage: "Whereas the [1968 rural construction effort in Long An] correctly recognized the need for redistributive measures, the program actually adopted by the Saigon and the American governments ignored the redistributive issues and concentrated instead on 'development' and on certain suppressive and intelligence functions." (p. 249) /// Race's methodology also compounds the problem. He quotes extensively from his sources (interviews and documents). (Race does so ostentatiously because the material remained in Vietnamese.) Although this technique is helpful for the researcher, it detracts from the narrative. Race also favors the analytic approach-with his conclusions frequently resting primarily on numerical data. He even offers a "graphic presentation" of his concepts in one of the appendices. Although these tools are effective, they narrow the scope of the book. Additionally, there is no bibliography and the reader is given little direction for further research. /// In summary, War Comes to Long An is a fine piece of scholarship. The author's observations and conclusions regarding the revolutionary movement in Long An extend far beyond the Mekong Delta. The book is best suited as supplemental reading for the graduate or undergraduate student of Vietnam.

Scritto da: not me

The Human Factor

"War Comes to Long An" deserves five stars if only for its moving final paragraph, which could serve as an epitaph for America's entire war in Vietnam. The book also deserves five stars as an outstanding example of humane and relevant social science: it developed a compelling model of village-level revolutionary war on the basis of extensive fieldwork and ground-level interviews in one South Vietnamese province (Long An). The book is nuanced, cliche-busting, and wise. It goes a long way toward explaining why the U.S. lost the war. There was nothing else like it when it came out in 1972. It is still outstanding, a classic. I put it down with only one question for the author, Jeffrey Race: Why didn't you publish more books?

Scritto da: rob

Put out an e-version!

Terrific book. I spent 6 years in Vietnam during the war, and knew Dr. Race briefly post-war in Thailand, where I still live. My copy of the original book is in storage in the US, and I want to buy an e-copy of the new edition. Why doesn't Amazon have an e-version of this remarkable book, still in print after so many decades? Shame on you.

Scritto da: Carter A. Malkasian

Brilliant

The graduate level book on counterinsurgency. Race challenges conventional wisdom on counterinsurgency and forces his readers to think about new ways to deal with insurgents. His insights are innovative and brilliant. Research is top-notch, based on years of work in Vietnam. One of the few books that repeatedly finds a place in my backpack for Iraq and Afghanistan.